Algeria’s strategy focuses on accepting the reality of Sahel military rule rather than pushing to restore past political systems
In April 2025, ties were severed following an incident involving the interception of a Malian drone by the Algerian armed forces near the shared border. All three AES member countries condemned the incident as a hostile act and recalled their ambassadors from Algeria. In response, Algeria also recalled its diplomatic representatives from Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou for consultations. However, the roots of the disagreements run much deeper: The events of 2025 marked the culmination of tensions that had accumulated for several years.
The situation in the Sahel remains extremely fragile. Since 2020, a series of internal and terrorist uprisings and eight coups have occurred in the region. The presence of Islamic extremists on the borders with Mali and Niger poses a direct threat to Algeria’s national security.
The events of the 2012 uprising in Mali were unprecedented: For the first time, they involved not only anti-government Tuareg movements but also Salafi-jihadist groups that purged Azawad region of those who supported its independence, captured the major cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal, and established the so-called Islamic State of Azawad.
Following the events of 2012, the Sahel region entered a deep crisis. Groups linked to the terrorist organizations Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) spread from central Mali into neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger, while Boko Haram, which operated in Nigeria, pledged allegiance to IS in 2015 and invaded southern Niger.
How Algeria interacts with the Tuaregs
Algeria has participated in all the negotiations on the Malian crises since the uprising in the 1990s. Algerian diplomatic efforts have repeatedly brought the conflicting parties to the negotiating table, ultimately leading to peace, with Algeria positioning itself as the traditional mediator between the Malian government and the Tuaregs and the guarantor of the peace agreements.
Algeria itself has experience in interacting with Berber (Tuareg) communities. Since the late 1960s, the Algerian authorities have succeeded in integrating the Tuareg population into the political process. Prominent Tuareg figures have gained representation in parliament and other government bodies, and many communities settled in the south of the country, where improved infrastructure was built.
Algeria also holds a negative view of foreign military involvement in the Malian conflict, believing it could strengthen jihadist ideology and consolidate separatist sentiments in the region. This, in turn, would lead to an influx of refugees to Algeria, which already hosts about 20,000 Malian refugees who arrived in the early 2010s. Algeria is also concerned that its own role in the region may be undermined. In particular, Operation Serval, launched by France in 2013, was perceived as interference in its zone of influence.
What do gas and migrants have to do with it?
These include the ambitious 4,100-kilometer Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP) project to export natural gas from Nigeria to Europe via Niger and Algeria, as well as the approximately 4,800-kilometer Trans-Sahara Highway, connecting Algiers with Lagos and also passing through Niger.
Following the significant changes that occurred in Niger in the wake of the 2023 military coup, Algeria stepped up efforts to resolve the situation. In late August 2023, Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf announced at a press conference that Algeria would present the international community with an initiative on Niger, including a plan for a political resolution of the crisis with a six-month civilian-led transition period. However, in October, Algeria’s initiative was frozen due to Niamey’s refusal to accept Algerian mediation.
In January 2024, Mali’s transitional government announced the termination of the peace agreement signed in 2015 between the Bamako authorities and the Tuareg rebels of Azawad. The cited reasons were “hostile actions” and interference in Mali’s internal affairs by the main mediator, Algeria. Among other complaints, Mali accused Algeria of hosting the offices of some groups that signed the 2015 accord and have turned into “terrorist actors.”
The long-standing contradictions culminated in the events that occurred in the spring of 2025. On the night of March 31-April 1, Algerian air defense forces shot down a Malian reconnaissance drone near the border region of Tin Zaouatine. The Algerian side claimed that the UAV had crossed the state border and posed a security threat. Mali rejected this version and called Algeria’s actions aggression. The military leadership of Burkina Faso and Niger, which had formed an alliance with Mali as part of the AES, supported Bamako’s position.
Why did Algeria seek rapprochement?
Algeria’s restoration of relations with its southern neighbors is not simply a gesture of goodwill. For Algeria, vital interests are at stake. Firstly, the situation in the Sahel has a direct impact on the national security of Algeria, which shares long borders with Mali and Niger. The routes of armed groups, smugglers, illegal migrants, and arms trafficking groups pass through the desert regions. Severed political channels hinder intelligence sharing and increase the risk of the loss of control over the border regions.
The Africa Corps, an expeditionary unit of the Russian Defense Ministry deployed in Mali from late 2024, provides training and combat support to national forces as part of a partnership with the alliance. Türkiye has strengthened its position as a supplier of drones and military equipment.
Morocco, a permanent rival of Algeria, is developing its own political and economic initiatives in West Africa. Under these circumstances, Algeria cannot afford to remain diplomatically isolated from its neighbors with whom it shares borders, history, and infrastructure interests.
Negotiations with Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali
In February 2026, Nigerien leader Abdourahamane Tiani’s visit to Algeria was presented as a turning point. The parties agreed to intensify bilateral mechanisms, infrastructure cooperation, personnel training, and contacts in the field of energy. At the same time, the two countries reinstated their ambassadors and the governments agreed to maintain high-level relations and intensify bilateral consultations.
With Burkina Faso, the normalization process was less visible to the public. Following the April 2025 crisis, Ouagadougou continued to criticize Algiers, but maintained interest in cooperation in the fields of mining, energy, and personnel training. In March 2026, analysts noted that the thaw in relations between Algeria, Niger, and Burkina Faso had created the conditions for a full resumption of cooperation.
On July 10, 2026, Algeria announced the reinstatement of its ambassador in Bamako and the full opening of its airspace to Malian aircraft. Mali responded with similar measures. Official contacts also resumed. Recently, the Algerian government announced an upcoming visit by the Malian prime minister, General Abdoulaye Maiga, to Algiers, marking another step toward resolving the crisis.
According to some reports, this rapprochement was facilitated by external mediators, including Russia, which considers both countries its key strategic partners in the region. However, it remains unclear whether agreements have been reached on issues such as the drone dispute and the status of the 2015 agreement. There has also been no announcement regarding the restoration of Algeria’s previous role as mediator.
What does this mean for the region?
For the Sahel countries, the benefits are also clear. They need additional external partners who would not be tied to the former colonial system and would lack immediate political demands. Algeria can offer access to Mediterranean ports, educational programs, medical cooperation, energy projects, and diplomatic support in international organizations.
Recent months have highlighted an important feature of Algeria’s strategy: It is based not on an attempt to force the military governments of the Sahel to return to their former political models but rather on the recognition of their de facto existence. Algeria may criticize the coups while simultaneously negotiating with the military forces that have come to power. This flexibility is consistent with its traditional diplomacy based on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference.
المصدر الأصلي: www.rt.com
تاريخ النشر لدى المصدر: 2026-09-02 15:25:00
كاتب المصدر: RT
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